

Vol. 14 No 8 October 1989

Edited, printed and published at Liverpool
 by Dr J. Pinsent & Ms Helena Hurt, BA
 Dept of Classics and Archaeology, The University,
 P.O. Box 147 Liverpool, L69 3BX, Tel. 051-794-2455
 RATES for 1989, 10 issues (not August and September)
 SURFACE £9.50 UK, £10.50 Europe, \$(US)18.50 elsewhere
 AIR £10 Europe, \$(US)27.50 N.America, \$(US)35 Australasia.



CONTENTS of which the authors retain the copyright.
 The editor retains copyright in the format

E.L. Harrison (Leeds): <i>Clymene's song</i> (Georgics 4. 345-7)	115
J.B. Hall (Royal Holloway & Bedford New College, London): <i>Bentley's Conjectures</i> in the <i>Silvae of Statius</i>	116
Graham Ley (Auckland): <i>Trivial gestures</i>	116-117
Christopher Pelling (University College, Oxford): <i>Rowland and Cullens on corn-doles</i>	117-119
Joseph B. Solodow (New Haven): <i>Persistence of Virgilian memories</i>	119-121
Harold Tarrant (Sydney): <i>Meno 98a: More Worries</i>	121-122
Lindsay Watson (Sydney): <i>Lucius Eilans: Apuleius Metamorphoses 3.1</i>	122-123
Review: H. J. Blumenthal (Liverpool)	124-128
Terence Irwin, <i>Classical Thought</i> ; An OPUS book: <i>A History of Western Philosophy 1</i> (OUP, Oxford & New York 1989). Pp. xii + 266. Cloth, £17.50. ISBN 0 19 219196 9	

Some careful readers of 'this and the two preceding numbers of *LCM* [this is called a modified formula] may have noticed that the staple in the top left hand corner was vertical and not horizontal, and also somewhat larger. This is because *LCM* has acquired a new and superior OCE copier, which automatically collates and staples each number, thus relieving the Editor of a tedious and time-consuming duty, and freeing him, it is hoped, for more productive work. If some numbers were not so stapled, this is not the fault of what has been unjustly called 'the idiot machine' but rather of the idiot operating the machine, who sometimes forgets to enter the correct instruction, and is then forced to deceive the machine, which will then only collate and not staple, leaving him to do that by hand.

At the same time *LCM* has acquired a new and superior Macintosh, the IICX, a veritable SuperMac and therefore named Stockton (overseas readers will need telling that this was the title assumed by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on his elevation to the peerage). Its increased memory speeds up all processes, and the large VDU (Video [and not Visual] Display Unit, he is informed) which displays two facing pages of a number at the same time, makes scrolling pairs of pages up and down both quick and easy, so that even the Editor, who is far from computer literate, can format a number in very much less time than it used to take him.

Astute readers will have realised that technological updating has to be paid for, may also be aware that the cost of postage is going up on October 1st, and will be expecting that the subscription is going to go up, as is indeed the case, and by no inconsiderable amount. For *LCM* has for too long been seriously underpriced, and while this could be tolerated while it remained something of an academic hobby, the Editor's impending retirement and the very considerable capitalisation incurred through the new technology means that it must increasingly be run on sound business principles. 'You have been warned!' Invoices, however will not go out until January, the Editor having discovered that *LCM* is taxed (for it is taxed) not on money actually received, but on invoices, so that payments in advance of the year for which they are made throw out the accounts. Those careful subscribers, therefore, who pay in

advance and uninvoiced are asked not to do so, but to await their invoice for 1990, the 15th year of publication, as the Editor is amazed to realise.

His assertion in the notes of the last issue (June) that 'the habits of scholarly thinking which we do want to inculcate can as well be acquired through classical studies and ancient history without the languages' has provoked a counter blast from the head, neck and forequarters of the other dinosaur, to whom it 'looks like a sophisticated provocation rather than the expression of the Editor's genuine sentiments'. 'However that may be', he [or they] continues, 'sufficient answer was given in 1856 in another part of the Kingdom

If the function of the classical Professor is to open up the life and thought of the two great nations of antiquity, and to illustrate and give interest to their literature and their history, how can they do this to any save those who have won some solid footing on ancient ground, by having mastered the whole, or, at least, large portions of some of the greatest classical authors? To those who have not done this, his lectures can but lead into an empty cloud-land, filled with shadows worse than ignorance by their semblance to knowledge.'



The Editor will concede only that his assertion may have contained elements of 'making the best of a bad job', or better, as he has said before, giving all our students what they are best able to assimilate, for he has never been convinced that a smattering of the language and a few books read most often in, or with the considerable aid of, a translation is better than a well-devised and rigorous course of Classical Studies. He is not immune, as readers will well know, from the temptations of rhetoric, and often flies kites which he will subsequently reel in, but he never expresses any opinion which he does not, at that time, hold, and must also make it plain, at the request of the Head of his Department, that the plan put forward after the sentence that provoked the other dinosaur, does not represent the policy of the Department but only, like anything else in these notes, those of the Editor, which will continue to be put forward in season and out of season.

At the moment out. For he learns not only from correspondents in South Africa and Australia of the sad state of Classics and Universities in those countries, but also from the current number of the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, that the problem is European and not simply British (though he suspects that the philistinism and anti-intellectualism may be peculiar to this country), and he would be particularly interested to hear from correspondents whether and if so to what extent it has affected the North American continent.

What may be the cause he does not know. Inflation or the Arms Race will be cited by some, according to taste, but the sums involved in Higher Education are not so large that this is likely to be the real cause. He suspects that the events of 1968 and the student protests of those days did a lot to lose for the Universities the public sympathy which they certainly had in the heady days of expansion and New Universities, and that we are now paying for them, as he suspected at the time that we would. Classics is affected first because most exposed to the question 'what use is it?', and because too many in positions of authority suffered at school from compulsory Latin. But if it is Classics today it will be English and History tomorrow, and Modern Languages may survive only in the most utilitarian form which some Departments are already adopting.

The problem is not new, and may go back to the Battle of the Books in the 17th century. The Editor concludes by trumping the other dinosaur's unattributed quotation by a tralatitician one from the American Freneau in 1775, which he has from William L. Vance, *America's Rome*, New Haven & London, Yale UP, 1989, vol.1 p.65, who has it in his turn, n.9, from Aldridge in [J.W.] Eadie [ed.], *Classical Traditions [in Early America]*, Ann Arbor 1976], p.109:

This age may decay, and another may arise,
Before it is fully revealed to our eyes,
That Latin and Hebrew, Chaldaic and Greek,
To the shades of oblivion must certainly sneak;
Too much of our time is employed in such trash

When we ought to be taught to accumulate cash.

[he is inclined to emend the first line, *metri gratia*, to 'another arise' or 'another may rise']. Whether or not Freneau was being ironic he does not know, but his sentiments seem to have been enthusiastically adopted by our masters.

What we are to do about it is for individuals, Departments and Universities to decide for themselves, according as their chief concern is the preservation of themselves, their Departments and their institutions or of their disciplines and their values. It is for the Editor to point the alternatives: if their concern is the former they will dilute the subject and teach it in translation: if the latter they will accept 'the shades of oblivion' and seek academic monasteries in which they may keep alive the subject and its languages against a new Renaissance some time in the future. Ideally, as suggested last month, they will try to combine the two.



Corrigenda to LCM 14.4 (Apr.1989), 51-53

In the letter from A.D.Godley on p.52, 4th line, 'Master of Arts' should be 'Masters of Arts', and the second paragraph of that letter was unfortunately omitted. It should read

That they have been effective in our present crisis there can be no doubt. Two days ago, the promised debate was held in 'Congregation' on the desirability of making Greek optional in our first examination: and I am glad to say that the University decided by a substantial majority (188-152) to retain Greek as a necessary subject.

and in the 4th paragraph of Wilamowitz' letter, the first full one on p.453, 'businessmen a' should be 'businessmen's'. Finally, at the end of the second line of the first note 'as' should be 'a'.

The Editor apologises to Professor Calder for these errors, and for the delay in correcting them, the reason for which should be apparent to readers. But it is timely that they should be referred back to that article and to the letter of Wilamowitz.

And the article in LCM 14.7 (Jul.1989), 103-104, on C. Billienus, attributed to J.A.S.Evans, who is not at Pretoria should be attributed to R.J.Evans, who is. To both of them the Editor offers his apologies.

E.L. Harrison (Leeds): *Clymene's song* (*Georgics* 4. 345-7)

LCM 14.8 (Oct.1989), 115

R. F. Thomas (*HSCP* 90 [1986], 190-3) has demonstrated the likelihood that Virgil drew on Callimachus' treatise *περὶ νυμφῶν* for his catalogue of nymphs in attendance on Cyrene (*Georgics* 4. 336-44). It might be worth adding that Virgil's actual handling of his Homeric model seems to proceed in a correspondingly Hellenistic fashion. In the *Odyssey* (8. 266 ff.) the risqué story of the cuckolding of Hephaestus is told by a male singer to an all-male audience (97 ff.), with the deities involved (apart from Aphrodite) all male too, because the females were too shy to join in the fun (324). Now the notion of female delicacy in such matters goes by the board as the same story is recited by a female performer for the delectation of an audience that is exclusively female: and for good measure she throws in an anthology of similarly scandalous anecdotes from Chaos onwards.

Thomas makes the attractive suggestion (see also his new *Georgics* commentary, ad 4. 345-7) that the choice may be accounted for by its etymological affinity to *περικλυτός*, which Homer applies to the original singer of the song, Demodocus (*Odyssey* 8. 367). Is it not possible that Clymene seemed a suitable name in such a context because its bearer was familiar enough with Helios to have had a son by him, and he, after all, was the one who blew the whistle on Ares in the first place? (See Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1. 765 ff.; *Odyssey* 8. 270 f.).

J.B. Hall (Royal Holloway & Bedford New College, London): *Bentley's Conjectures in the Silvae of Statius* LCM 14.8 (Oct.1989), 116

Various conjectures by Bentley himself are recorded in the margins of his copy of the 1616 edition by Gevartius now conserved in the British Library, shelfmark 687.c.10, and, in addition, he jotted down there a number of contributions by earlier scholars, presumably by way of indicating his approbation of their efforts. Most of these conjectural suggestions have found their way into Phillimore's OCT edition (although Phillimore does not, so far as I can see, say whence he got them), but there remains a small residue, which I here present with all brevity, for the sake of completing the record. In each case I give the numeration and text of Phillimore's edition before the colon, and after it Bentley's conjecture.

- 1.1.28 *et minor in leges gener et Cato Caesaris iret: et minor in leges iret gener et Cato vestras*
- 1.2.45 *praepete suspensum veheret: te potius crocea aveheret*
- 1.2.27 *virides: viridi*
- 1.3.19 *umbra: unda*
- 1.3.36 *vena: luna*
- 2.3.9 *it: del.*
- 2.6 *tit. EPICEDION PILETI VRSI ed. Geuart.: Phileti*
- 2.6.39 *post crimina: discrimina (= Marklandus)*
- 2.7.90 *longa fata: fata longa (e festa longa)*
- 2.7.135 *fleverat: fleverit*
- 3.1.30 *antraque: antrave*
- 3.1.60 *Hecateidas: Hecateas*
- 3.2.112 *aras: arces*
- 3.3.25 *haec: o*
- 3.3.40 *similis: similem*
- 3.3.134 *collectaeque: collataeque Gronou. cit. Bentr.*
- 3.5.7 *emeritis: emensis*
- 4.4.102 *Tirynthius: te certius*
- 5.3.40 *infaustae: infestae*
- 5.3.9 *†cydalibem†: Cyclo labor*
- 5.3.129 *longo: longae*
tunc in lacuna Parthenopeque suppl.
- 5.3.132 *victos: victas.*

Copyright © 1989 J.B.Hall

Graham Ley (Auckland): *Trivial gestures*

LCM 14.8 (Oct.1989), 116-117

Oliver Taplin, with the assumed authority that is so typical of all his writing, has chosen to distinguish in his discursive *Greek Tragedy in Action* between significant and trivial actions and gestures in the performance of Greek tragedy (GTA 16/9, and 58/9 especially). Like many of Taplin's 'rules' for the Greek theatre, this distinction is actually meaningless, grounded as it is on what for Taplin, and many other scholarly commentators, constitutes a 'significant' moment for the *later* interpretation of plays, rather than on any understanding of theatre practice.

Two simple points will serve to establish this criticism. The first is actually raised by Taplin, only to be dismissed (GTA 58): I refer to the use of the Greek word *ὄδῃ*, regularly found in dramatic texts. The word is a 'pointer', by and large, and entails reference to something (or someone) close at hand, if not actually visible. Clearly if dramatists chose, as they did, to include these references regularly in their scripts, and if we take, as Taplin does, the final text

in this convention as inclusive of all necessary stage-directions, then we risk contradicting the judgement of the dramatist if we bracket all such gestures as 'run-of-the-mill' (GTA 58), as Taplin does.

The second point is a matter of technique, and of the position of the critic. Contemplating a text of Sophocles, I am amused by the picture of the playwright instructing his actors to pay attention only to the grand moments, and to regard all others as, shall we say, 'run-of-the-mill'. Is it really responsible of Taplin to suggest, without argument, that the philosophy of theatre practice, actors' skills, and direction or rehearsal was in Greek antiquity unquestionably consonant with his own misguided view of a theatre of grand moments? What is the basis for this vision? And if it is unfounded, how far should we trust the conclusions of this privileged director '*sans théâtre*', who is not (we should add) even obliged to say in the whole course of his work *where* his actors acted in the playing space he sketches?

A play proceeds at all its moments. There is not one shred of evidence from any convention known to me that a performer (especially a *speaking* performer) is free to discard any moment of performance in favour of another. The theatre *at its worst* may do so, of course: but it is not of the constitution of any major public performance convention that we can name. To reconstitute a convention on these terms is simply scholarly nonsense, and should be dismissed as such.

What then might we conclude about the actors' technique (if that is our subject) in Greek antiquity? Well, hands will do, if only to demonstrate in miniscule what was done by a playwright and actors. The *Women of Trachis* by Sophocles is a central work of the fifth-century B.C., and is currently being recognised as such. It is also a theatrically demonstrative work, marking some at least of its progress by *ὅδε*: 'this is the man', 'that is the casket'. At the conclusion of the play, the hero Herakles seeks a pledge of faith from his son, an oath registered to Zeus by a clasp of hands. As before Herakles, on his stretcher, crippled, racked in pain, has begged to have his wife delivered by hand into his hands, the same hands that alone may move and perhaps act, that accomplished his vast, physical labours. As his son Hyllos, who has helped to carry him, who has lifted him up, is to order the construction of the pyre – only not to touch it with his own hands for fear of pollution.

Read the play again – and watch out for the grand moments. The rest are only trivial gestures.

Copyright © 1989 Graham Ley

Christopher Pelling (University College, Oxford): *Rowland and Cullens on corn-doles*

LCM 14.8 (Oct.1989), 117-119

In LCM 13.7 (Jul.1988), 98-9, A.J.Cullens usefully points out an error in R.J.Rowland's calculation from *Verrines* 2.3.163 (*Acta Antiqua Hung.* 13 [1965], 81-3): the amount of *Sicilian* corn purchased under the Terentian-Cassian law, if it were all distributed at the cheap rate and in rations of five *modii* a month, would seem to cater for some 110,000 recipients rather than the 180,000 which Rowland claimed. But it seems rash to conclude from this that this was the total number of recipients under the *lex*.

For one thing, Sicily did not provide the entire corn-supply of the Roman Republic, and there would be sizable contributions from Africa and Sardinia. That seems to imply that the figure might have been larger; but there is also the rather strong evidence that the *lex* restricted distributions to a much smaller figure, possibly 40,000 (cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.72: of course we must beware of rhetorical exaggeration, but it is hard to believe that the true figure was three times as much). Possibly something has gone wrong with the figures, which would be wholly unsurprising; but it is much more likely that, as Brunt (*Italian Manpower* [Oxford 1971], 378-9) and Rickman (*The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome* [Oxford 1980], 168) suggested, not all of this corn was to be distributed at the cheap rate. In that case, the *Verrines* passage gives no basis at all for any calculations of number of recipients.

Cullens goes on to discuss two passages of Plutarch, *Cato minor* 26.1 and *Caesar* 8.6-7. Both deal with Cato's corn-dole, which Plutarch puts in December 63. In the *Caesar* passage Plutarch gives a figure for the *additional* expenditure authorised by Cato's bill, apparently 7,500,000 drachmas:

διὸ καὶ Κάτων φοβηθεὶς μάλιστα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀπόρων νεωτερισμόν, οἱ τοῦ παντὸς ὑπέκκαυμα πλήθους ἦσαν ἐν τῷ Καίσαρι τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχοντες, ἔπεισε τὴν σύγκλητον ἀπονεῖμαι σιτηρέσιον αὐτοῖς ἑμνηνον, ἐξ οὗ δαπάνης μὲν ἑπτακόσiai πεντήκοντα μυριάδες ἐνιαύσιοι προσεγένοντο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀναλώμασι, τὸν μὲντοι μέγαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φόβον ἔσβεσε περιφανῶς τὸ πολίτευμα τοῦτο καὶ [τὸ] πλείστον ἀπέρρηξε τῆς Καίσαρος δυνάμεως καὶ διεσκέδασεν ἐν καιρῷ, στρατηγεῖν μέλλοντος καὶ φοβερωτέρου διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν διτος.

ἑπτακόσiai πεντήκοντα PHC: πεντακόσiai πεντήκοντα Λ (= L et apographa ABD); ἑξακόσiai πεντήκοντα M

This was why Cato, who feared above all things that there might be a rebellion starting from the poorer classes who, with their hopes fixed on Caesar, were kindling a fire among the general population, persuaded the senate to give them a monthly ration of grain – which meant an addition to the expenditure of the state of 7 1/2 million drachmas [or *denarii*] a year. Nevertheless, this was a measure which definitely had the effect of removing the great fear that was felt at the time; it weakened and dispersed Caesar's power just at the right moment. He had been elected praetor for the next year and could have been more formidable still in this office.

(*Caes.* 8.6-7, trans. Scott-Kilvert)

The *Cato* passage gives a similar figure, except that it is phrased in terms of the Greek equivalent, 1250 talents:

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Λέντλον ἀναιρεθέντων, καὶ τοῦ Καίσαρος, περὶ ὧν εἰσηγγέλθη καὶ διεβλήθη πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον, εἰς τὸν δῆμον καταφυγόντος καὶ τὰ πολλὰ νοσοῦντα καὶ διεφθαρμένα τῆς πολιτείας μέρη ταραττοντος καὶ συνάγοντος πρὸς αὐτόν, ὁ Κάτων φοβηθεὶς ἔπεισε τὴν βουλὴν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἄπορον καὶ ἀνέμητον ὄχλον εἰς τὸ σιτηρέσιον, ἀναλώματος μὲν διτος ἐνιαυσίου χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων καὶ πεντήκοντα ταλάντων, περιφανῶς δὲ τῇ φιланθρωπίᾳ ταύτῃ καὶ χάριτι τῆς ἀπειλῆς ἐκείνης διαλυθείσης.

Lentulus and his associates had been executed, and Caesar, accused and attacked in the senate, had taken refuge with the ordinary people; he was stirring up the many ailing, corrupt elements in the state, and bringing them over to himself. That made Cato fearful, and he persuaded the senate to include in the corn-dole the poor and destitute, men who had hitherto been excluded from the distributions. The annual cost was 1250 talents; but the threat was splendidly met by this liberal and generous gesture.

(*Cato minor* 26.1)

Following Rowland, Cullens insists that the *Cato* figure refers to the *total* expenditure on grain, and therefore assumes that this contradicts the *Caesar* passage, where the equivalent figure refers only to the *additional* expenditure in 63; he therefore, again following Rowland, prefers the 5,500,000 reading in the *Caesar* passage. That is in fact the reading L – 'the best manuscript', he says. He proceeds to calculate the number of new recipients on the assumption that this extra money would buy grain at 4 HS a *modius* (the Sicilian price). There are three problems here.

(i) It is most unlikely that the *Cato* passage refers to the total expenditure: the context makes it clear that Plutarch refers to the effects of this particular measure. The negative effect (μὲν) was the annual cost to the treasury, the positive (δὲ) the dissolution of the political threat: it would be distracting and pointless to include a reference to the total expenditure, including the sum to which the treasury was already committed. Exactly the same contrast is drawn in the *Caesar*: the expense (μὲν), but also the political deftness (μέντοι). As so often in this group of *Lives*, Plutarch uses the same narrative articulation and only marginally different language to make similar points. Some other examples from his accounts of 63 B.C. are collected in *Hermes* 113 (1985), 318-9.

(ii) The emendation of the *Caesar* passage is not justified. There is certainly some confusion in the manuscript tradition, more even than is clear from the Teubner apparatus, for Ziegler did not note the variant in M. But it is notoriously dangerous to talk of 'best manuscripts' (and in any case the erratic qualities of L should disqualify it from that title; in simple numerical terms, H is 'correct' much more often). Even if Ziegler (Teubner *Vitae* ii² [1968], viii) was right and no stemma can be established, it is clear that the ἐπτακόσια reading spans the tradition, whereas πεντακόσια is limited to L and its *apographa*: if L were right, it is unclear why such agreement should be found elsewhere. I intend to argue elsewhere that a stemma can be established, positing a common hyparchetype for P and Q (= CM): but that only marginally affects the issue here. In view of Plutarch's habit of reproducing the same material in different *Lives*, the ἐπτακόσια reading is as secure as any numeral can ever be. (One explanation of the mistake in L was given long ago by Rualdus (*Animadversiones* XXII) φ' would readily corrupt into ψ'. But the scribe's eye may simply have slipped to the following πεντήκοντα).

(iii) So the additional expenditure was 7 1/2 million denarii, not 5 1/2; but we still cannot know how many extra recipients this catered for. We cannot assume that the Sicilian price was standard, and anyway only a part of the cost to the state would be the purchase price: expenditure on transport, storage, and administration would have to be added to this; and the selling price of 6 1/3 asses *per modium* would have to be subtracted. It is clear that any calculations have to be very cautious and very vague.

Copyright © 1989 Christopher Pelling.

Joseph B. Solodow (New Haven): *Persistence of Virgilian memories*

LCM 14.8 (Oct.1989), 119-121

Upon the publication of the *Aeneid* Virgil immediately became the classic Latin poet. Despite the somewhat unfinished state of his poem, despite the criticisms levelled against it by his detractors, from the very first he was admired, studied, and imitated by Latin writers. His influence upon subsequent authors has by no means been ignored in literary history. Still, it may be worthwhile to examine some of the odd and unexpected ways in which later generations familiarity with Virgil manifested itself. Several years ago Wendell Clausen elucidated certain difficult passages of Juvenal by reference to Virgil (HSCP 80 [1976], 181-86). He showed convincingly that obscurities arose because Juvenal carried in his memory verses of Virgil, which by influencing Juvenal's language obscured the clarity of expression. This paper may be considered an extension of Clausen's. I propose to explain here the origins of a puzzling phrase from Ovid and an inaccurate quotation by Seneca the Younger. Only incidentally do I defend particular readings in the texts. I am interested rather in revealing the depth at which Virgil's language was embedded in men's minds. My two cases, though different from one another, converge on this point.

I. In Book Eleven of the *Metamorphoses* Ovid describes the violent storm that in the end destroyed Ceyx's ship. At one moment he focusses on the terror and confusion of the helmsman

*ipse pavet nec se, qui sit status, ipse fatetur
scire satis rector, nec quid iuberetve velitve.*(492-93)

The last phrase, *quid iuberetve velitve*, causes the difficulty. The reading of the chief MSS., it consists of a pair of near synonyms: 'he does not know what to command or to wish'. At the same time it echoes unmistakably a formula from Roman political life: *velitis iubeatis (ne) Quirites* were the opening words of a *rogatio*, in which the presiding magistrate asked the citizen body for their votes on the matter before them (Mommson, *RStR* III.i.312 n.2). So the cast of Ovid's language suggests that the helmsman confused is like a public assembly asked about its political will – asked and, we are forced to suppose, uncertain about it.

The awkwardness of the phrase has disturbed editors. Some in fact, including Heinsius, Merkelm, Ehwald (*ed. min.* 1888) and Bömer, felt it to be so inappropriate that they rejected it, preferring instead *vetetve*, which is found in some MSS. This reading also conveys the helmsman's dilemma, though not altogether aptly, since under the circumstances a negative command is implausible. Still, the reading receives some support from *Trist.* 1.2.31-2: *rector in incerto est nec quid fugiateve petatve | invenit*¹. This phrase too would be one drawn from legislation: *iubere* and *vetare* were regularly paired in the meanings 'vote yes' and 'vote no' (cf. Titius, *orat.* 2, Cic. *Parad.* 36, *Caec.* 95, *Flacc.* 15, *de Or.* 1.60, *Legg.* 3.10). To whatever pair of technical terms be right, however, there clings an awkwardness which I believe it is possible to explain.

Ovid's storm, modelled upon the one at the beginning of the *Aeneid*, contains many reminiscences of it. If we compare *Aen.* 1.87 (*insequitur clamorque virum stridorque rudentum*) with *Met.* 11.495 (*quippe sonant clamore viri, stridore rudentes*), we cannot doubt that Ovid had Virgil's storm in mind. Now in the *Aeneid*, we recall, the storm scene ends with that remarkable simile which compares Neptune calming the sea to a statesman calming an aroused citizenry: *ac veluti magno in populo* etc. (1.148-53). This simile, moreover, caps a line of political imagery in the passage: Virgil portrays the relationship between the winds and Aeolus in the terms of politics (see Joseph B. Solodow, *The World of Ovid's Metamorphoses* [Chapel Hill 1988], 115). The political language, associated with the storm in Ovid's memory, affected his choice of words. This accounts for the inappropriate technical phrase². Indeed, the very lack of appropriateness gives us the clue that something extraneous was floating before the poet's mind – a recollection of the *Aeneid*.

II. The second case is more complex, since it involves three authors. Seneca the Younger, in the *Naturales Quaestiones* (3.27.14), portrays the catastrophe which would one day befall the universe. To embellish the picture, he quoted – and quoted inexactly – a verse from the *Metamorphoses*, from the passage in Book One where the poet describes the great flood with which Jupiter had punished mankind³. Seneca says: *pressaeque labant sub gurgite turre*. The correct verb in Ovid (1.290) is *latent*, however. *latent* is also read, it is true, in several Senecan MSS, F and some of the λ class, which is closely related to it here. But there can be no doubt that *labant* stood in the archetype and was the word written by Seneca⁴. This is the view which all editors take. Why, we may ask, did Seneca misquote?

No doubt he relied on his memory, which was not perfectly accurate. Shortly before our passage, for example, he misquotes Ovid three times in four verses (*Nat.* 3.26.4, quoting *Met.* 15.273-76). Similarity in sound surely eased the substitution of *labant* for *latent*. Moreover, the presence of *pressae*, a verb denoting action, may have evoked a word more

¹ H. Magnus, *Hermes* 39 (1904), 52, who defended *velitve*, turned the matter upside down when he suggested that *vetetve* originated as an interpolation made under the influence of this passage.

² This view gains some confirmation from the echo of Virgil's *regit* (1.153) in Ovid's *rector* (11.493).

³ F. Levy, *Philologus* 83, NF37 (1928), 459-66, compares Ovid's description with Seneca's and rightly emphasizes the spiritual kinship between the two.

⁴ I am eager to express my gratitude to Professor Harry M. Hine of the University of Edinburgh, who checked for me his own collations and microfilms of the MSS. and generously shared his knowledge and expert opinion. He has discussed the relationship among the MSS. in *CQ* NS30 (1980), 183-217.

vigorous than *latent*⁵.

But at the same time Seneca's memory was also led off track by recollection of the *Aeneid*. The picture of the towers tottering under the impact of the waves owed something to a famous passage in Virgil in which a tower topples and falls: the besieging of Priam's palace by the Greek soldiers under Neoptolemus. There the word *turris* is found linked to *labare* (*Aen.* 2.460, 463; the cognate *lapsa* occurs in 465). The memory of this scene has interfered in Seneca's quoting of Ovid. And this may have been aided by the fact that when describing the flood Ovid himself had used the metaphor of the waves as soldiers: consider, for instance, *auxiliares undae* 275, *bucina* 335, and *receptus* 340. Seneca, recalling the Ovidian passage, was affected by the scene from Virgil. For that matter, it is likely that Ovid was similarly affected as he composed his passage.

We are not dealing here with literary imitation of any sort. Ovid and Seneca were not modelling themselves on Virgil nor deliberately invoking him. On the contrary, they must have been unaware of his influence upon their words, for otherwise they would not have written ineptly or inaccurately. It is precisely this lack of consciousness and purpose on their part which best permits us to gauge how deeply Virgilian memories persisted. The poet who 'overheard' so much of earlier poetry was himself in turn 'overheard' by later poets.

Copyright © 1989 Joseph B. Solodow.

Harold Tarrant (Sydney) *Meno* 98a: *More Worries*

LCM 14.8 (Oct.1989), 121-122

In a paper written in 1985, and now published in *The Criterion of Truth (Essays in honour of George Kerferd)*, ed. P. M. Huby and G. C. Neal (Liverpool, 1989), I question whether the text of *Meno* 98a3-4 can be relied upon. It seemed to me that the fact that the anonymous *Theaetetus*-Commentator, perhaps our earliest witness, read *ἀλτία λογισμοῦ* rather than *ἀλτίας λογισμῶ*, while the latter had suspicious affinities with the late Hellenistic medical notion of *ἀλτίας ἐπιλογισμός*, was enough to require that one should hesitate before accepting the manuscript reading. I tried to offer one possible explanation of the commentator's reading which would be philosophically satisfying, attaching importance to the need for the pupil to take over, from the questioner, responsibility for the argument which supported his correct belief. This would involve, in the words of Alexander Nehamas (*OSAP* 3 [1985], p.23) 'the ability to organize [beliefs] systematically, to become able to move from one of them to another properly and *on one's own*, to know how they are supported by one another'. [Emphasis mine]

I should here like to offer some further thoughts, based upon passages elsewhere in the corpus, which may have a direct bearing on the concept of an *ἀλτία* used by Plato at 98a. I owe to William Charlton the observation that what binds right opinions in place (so that they become knowledge) ought to be connected with Plato's explanation of why unbound opinions are so transient. One thinks of forgetfulness and of one's susceptibility to sophistic argument as possible reasons. But let us consider what *Alcibiades* I has to say.

Between 106 and 119 the *Meno* is relevant in various ways. By 109e, Socrates has dismissed (a) the possibility that Alcibiades has learned (from a teacher) moral knowledge relevant to political virtue (106e) and (b) the idea that he has discovered it (since he has not searched because of his belief that he knew). In fact Alcibiades claimed he knew about justice as a boy, and is aware of no time at which he thought he did not know (110c), circumstances that might suggest to the reader the Theory of Recollection from *Meno* 81c ff. At 110d the notion that one can learn justice from the ordinary person (like learning Greek, cf. *Prot.* 327e-328a) is canvassed, a rather more radical version of Anytus' view at *Meno* 92e. At 118c Pericles' claims to political wisdom are introduced, but they are found wanting because he was unable

⁵ None the less, the scribe of U, who also slipped at this point, wrote *iacent*, not far removed palaeographically from *latent* and equally indicative of a state rather than a movement. About the reading of U, which was not employed by Gercke, Professor Hine has also informed me.

even to teach his sons, as at *Meno* 94b. The question of transitory beliefs is discussed at 116e-118b. Most important for our present purposes is the presence here of the concept of an *αἰτία* or *αἴτιον* of one's vacillating or remaining firm in one's beliefs. Alcibiades does not vacillate over the number of eyes he has; the *reason* is that he knows (117a3); changes of opinion must stem from ignorance (a5-11), but not from any ignorance; the *reason* for these (b9), which also turns out to be a *reason* for going wrong (118a4), is imagining one knows when one does not.

Since the authenticity of the *Alcibiades* I is usually disputed, even though its earliness and its Platonicity are not, it would be as well to point out that the notion of ignorance as a reason for wavering in one's opinions is present also in the *Hippias Minor* (372d8-e1). So too is the notion of arguments as causes of a new, strongly held, belief: *αἰτιῶμαι δὲ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος παθήματος τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λόγους αἰτίους εἶναι*. Ignorance is a reason for wavering, arguments are a reason for powerful beliefs. Reasons (*αἰτίαι*) for the instability, relative stability and permanence of beliefs was a topic discussed by the early Academy. It thus seems more probable that the *αἰτία* at *Meno* 98a was introduced as an explanation of an opinion's permanence than as something else to be calculated. We are obliged to consider the possibility that Plato wrote at *Meno* 98a3-4 that right opinions were not of great value until some reason for working-things-out binds them (*ὥς ἂν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτία λογισμοῦ*). One might argue that it ought to be the *λογισμός* rather than the reason for it which does the binding, but it was critically important in the *Meno* to give somebody the reason to try and work things out: indeed it was the justification of the Socratic elenchus. And the reason for trying to work things out was the realization that one's previous supposed knowledge was illusory (84a-c). One will not work things out if one thinks one knows them well enough already. In this respect it did not ought to matter whether one's assumed knowledge had been false opinion or true.

Let us now try to see how the author of *Epistle* II 313b interpreted *Meno* 98a. He is allowing for the possibility that Dionysius II may have come by the truth *θεῖα μοίρα* 122, which is the lucky route to right opinion at *Meno* 99e6. Such an opinion would, if bound, acquire stability, but Dionysius has wavered (313b7-c1). Why? Evidently because he has not bound down the demonstrations of it *in the belief that he had grasped it firmly* (b6-7). Having reached correct opinion, says the author, he had failed to make it permanent because he thought he had understood already. He resembles the *Meno*'s slave-boy at 85bc who has been over a *proof* that the diagonal of a square of four produces the square of eight, but who does not yet *know* the truth and needs a great deal more investigating before he will do so. There is no hint that Dionysius has somehow failed to work out the *reasons* for the conclusions to which he had come; the *reasons* were no different from the proofs which he had employed already. The failure to bind was the result of his having no reason to calculate further. Therefore it seems likely that the author of the *Epistle* was familiar with the text *ὥς ἂν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτία λογισμοῦ*, not *αἰτίας λογισμῶ*, and that he interpreted the 'reason for calculating' as the recognition that one does not yet know.

What this author read at 98a does not necessarily conform with what Plato wrote, but I believe that it considerably adds to the evidence of anon. *Tht.* cols. 3 and 15. The word order is right, for Thucydides wrote *ὥς ἂν τις παρατύχῃ διαφύγῃ ἐπιτηδεία* (8.11). In both cases the indefinite follows *ἂν* and belongs with a noun from which it is separated by the subjunctive; further qualification of that noun follows it.

Copyright © 1989 Harold Tarrant

Lindsay Watson (Sydney): *Lucius Eilulans: Apuleius Metamorphoses* 3.1

LCM 14.8 (Oct.1989), 122-123

On p. 90 of her recent book *Unity in Diversity: A Study of Apuleius' Metamorphoses* (Hildesheim, 1987), Paula James offers an illuminating insight on one aspect of the thematic interrelationship between Lucius and Thelyphron. Apropos of Lucius' rejection of Byrrhaena's second invitation to dinner (*Met.* 3.12), which follows immediately after he has

been held up to public ridicule in the *Risus* Festival, she observes 'Lucius must see the request as the beginning of a second humiliation. *Undoubtedly Lucius is required to replace Thelyphron, taking on the role of court jester* (my italics). Implicit in Byrrhaena's invitation is the expectation that Lucius will entertain her guests with an account of the goatskins and the mock trial'.

In fact a much deeper parallelism exists between Lucius and Thelyphron than James had occasion to show. The humiliation of Lucius at the Festival of Laughter is the diurnal counterpart of the mockery suffered by the disfigured Thelyphron at Byrrhaena's the previous evening. Both are *peregrini*¹, both are subjected to cruel and malicious laughter by the Hypatans, and both are, in their different ways, brought to this pass by Byrrhaena. The grotesquely mutilated Thelyphron is evidently present at Byrrhaena's elegant banquet on the understanding that he will pay for his evening's entertainment by treating the other guests to a *Schadenfreude*-provoking account of how he came by his disfigurement. As for Lucius and the *Risus* Festival, James pp. 87ff. is surely correct to suspect the complicity of Byrrhaena in the whole affair. But the most important link between Lucius and Thelyphron is that both display a foolish indifference to the destructive potential of magic – in Thelyphron's case because, like Aristomenes, he refuses to take the whole subject seriously until it is too late (*Met.* 2.23), in Lucius', because he is so obsessed with the gathering of arcane knowledge that he is blind to the dangers involved.

I suggest that the thematic nexus between Lucius and Thelyphron has been reinforced by a clever verbal point which has gone unnoticed by the commentators. Thelyphron's name ('Feeblewit') is a composite of *θηλυς*, 'female', and *φρονέω*, 'think'². It is therefore interesting that, just at the moment when he dons the mantle of Thelyphron with his 'womanly', that is to say 'weak', intellect, Lucius is described as engaging in an activity, *eiulare*, which is particularly associated with females ('*eiulabam meas fortunas*', says the hero at *Met.* 3.1, just before the magistrates arrive to hale him off to court on the 'murder' charge).

eiulare and its cognates are, for the most part, used in two characteristic ways, both of which suggest that *eiulatio* was, properly speaking, the prerogative of women. In the first place, the term designates characteristically female cries of distress e.g. Suet. *Nero* 29 *voces quoque et eiulatus vim patientium virginum imitatus*, Tac. *Ann.* 16.10, Tert. *Anim.* 39.2 *in partu Lucinae et Dianae eiulatur*, and Prud. *Cath.* 7.145 *eiulantes feminae*. With a single exception (*Met.* 4.34)³, the verb and its cognates are always used thus in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, to describe extravagant expressions of grief by females: see e.g. 4.24 *altius eiulans sese*, of Charite's reaction to her kidnapping by the robbers. Second, *eiulare* is applied to males who are unmanned by fear or excess of anguish, or who display an insufficiently virile spirit in the face of adversity. For the first, see Hor. *Epod.* 10.17 *illa non virilis eiulatio* with Ps. Acro ad loc. and Cic. *TD* 2.19 <Philoctetes> *Herculem viderat in Oeta magnitudine dolorum eiulantem*. For the latter, cf. Gell. 12.5.9.

To summarise. At the commencement of Book 3, where attention shifts back from Thelyphron to Lucius, whose role of victim of mockery and the magical arts Lucius now assumes, a hint is dropped, by means of a linguistic pointer, that Lucius displays the same feebleness and foolishness of mind and spirit as characterised his immediate predecessor: a feebleness which will issue eventually in the hero's absurd transformation.

Copyright © 1989 Lindsay Watson

¹ *Met.* 2.30: *Nec postea debilis ac sic ridiculus Lari me patrio reddere potui* (Thelyphron).

² On Thelyphron's name, and Apuleius' punning exploitation of it at 2.23, see J.J. Winkler, *Auctor et Actor: a Narratological Reading of Apuleius's The Golden Ass* (Berkeley, 1985), 115. In general on *redende Namen* in Apuleius, see B. L. Hijmans Jr. 'Significant Names and their Function in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*', pp. 107-22 in *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass*, ed. Hijmans and Van der Paardt (Groningen, 1978).

³ Where *eiulatus* is used of the grief of Psyche's aged mother and father. There are indications (Val. Max. 3.3 ext.2, Heges. 5.1.5) that *eiulatus* was thought of as characteristic of old men as well as women, presumably because the voices of old men become shrill, and therefore womanish in quality.

Review: H.J.Blumenthal (Liverpool)

LCM 14.8 (Oct.198), 124-128

Terence Irwin, *Classical Thought*; An OPUS book: *A History of Western Philosophy* 1
(OUP, Oxford & New York 1989). Pp. xii + 266. Cloth, £17.50. ISBN 0 19 219196 9

'Spanning over a thousand years from Homer to St. Augustine. . .' in 221 pages might seem an impossible task. Russell's *History of Western Philosophy* covers much the same ground in 365. With such restrictions readers will, as I. realises, disagree about what should be included, and to argue about that is, in general, a waste of time. Not so with respect to the *termini*: if the Christian Augustine qualifies as the first medieval philosopher, pagan classical thought continued for another two centuries: the exclusion of this period deprives the reader of any treatment of Proclus, the real author of the *Liber de causis*, and the man who may have been his pupil, Ps.Dionysius the Areopagite, as well as other Neoplatonists whose influence on philosophy written in Arabic, and so in due course on the Latin West, was by no means negligible; it received a considerable boost when Aquinas caused his Flemish friend and fellow Dominican the Archbishop of Corinth to translate some of their work from the original Greek. Moreover Iamblichus, from whom Proclus and his successors derived many of their ideas, falls within I.'s limits, and might have offered an opportunity for at least a glance at later developments. All this would be less important if one could be sure that these matters will be handled in the volume on medieval philosophy: the western parochialism of most medievalists does not inspire confidence that will be the case.

Most histories of philosophy, for that is what this is, are rather thin on the contemporary intellectual climate of the philosophers they discuss, and it is good to see I. bringing in other literature: unfortunately this stops when the kind of philosophy which modern philosophers take seriously – that of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle – begins. This leads to some extraordinary omissions, of figures some of whom might in any case have been included under the heading of philosophy. Thus Seneca has, arguably, four lines in a footnote on Stoic opposition under the early principate, Cicero and Plutarch appear as sources and Isocrates is a no-show, as is Posidonius whose disappearance cannot be justified by the grossly exaggerated importance he once enjoyed (for an early attempt at realism see A.D.Nock in *JRS* 49 [1959], 1-15). What does presumably explain his absence as well as Seneca's is I.'s policy (see below) of not distinguishing Stoics, an understandable decision but one which totally obscures the serious and important differences between Zeno and Chrysippus on the one hand and the Platonizing Stoics of the later Hellenistic and imperial periods on the other.

Perhaps the curious transition from one *σκόπος* to another – all the later volumes in the series are to have 'Philosophy', or the names of well-known groups of philosophers in their titles, explains why only just over a quarter of the book is devoted to Plato and Aristotle, and a mere 7% to Plotinus.

I., who might properly be described as a 'leading ancient philosopher' is on less sure ground when he deals with classical thought outside Socrates, Plato and Aristotle – one wonders if the almost simultaneous publication of a huge and important book on Aristotle (*Aristotle's First Principles*, Oxford 1988) might not have something to do with this.

I. begins with Homer, and the identification of an 'Homeric outlook' to which he finds later thinkers opposed. Perhaps over-influenced by Adkins, I. sees the moral outlook of Homeric epic as determined by the 'competitive virtues', encouraging individuals to advance their interests or those of their close small group 'at the expense of the rest of the community' (p.36). Quite apart from the fact that we know nothing about 'the rest of the community', this attitude is obsolete even for the *Iliad* as reconfigured by the insertion of Book 9, and *a fortiori* for the *Odyssey*: I. gives virtually no indication that different values may be found in the two epics. It is, incidentally, odd to find I. (p. 7) opposing the narrative verse of Homeric epic to philosophical argument. After all Parmenides, and, most of the time, Empedocles were to combine the two. The pre-Socratics, unusually dubbed 'naturalists', are seen as reacting to the Homeric world-view, an oversimplification which is nonetheless preferable to seeing the Milesians as some sort of outrunners of Mesopotamia. The main re-agent in I.'s account is the

horrid Heraclitus, a bastard whom the house ought to have suppressed (I hope this protest will not be seen as mere pedantry from one who is no supporter of fashionable pedersties like Akhilleus and Sokrates). Is it really correct to see the pre-Socratics as believers in order and causation, whose systems are opposed to an Homeric universe which is normally ruled by causation but where some things happen 'by chance, at random, for no particular reason' a statement for which Vlastos (who doesn't say this, cf. *Plato's Universe* 10-13, but attributes cosmic irregularities to divine intervention, with examples from Herodotus and Pindar) rather than Homer appears to be the authority (p. 15 and n.18). After all, the noun *τύχη* appears in Democritus but never in Homer.

With the pre-Socratics I. is on firmer ground, though I would yet again raise a doubt about the extent to which Heraclitus might be seen as having fixed views and a clearly identifiable system. So much of what remains of him could be better, if less philosophically, explained by seeing him as an eristic debunker of what he considered useless Milesian speculation. When I. on p.43 says that each of the critics of 'naturalism' he there names attacked some claim of Heraclitus' one is tempted to reply that that is hardly surprising since Heraclitus claimed and rejected anything you care to name. On p.23 I. remarks that Anaximander seems unable to explain previous – to the cosmogony – changes in the unbounded. It is perhaps worth considering that the man who may be credited with the first statement of the principle of sufficient reason (cf. DK 12A11 (3) and A26, and S.Sambursky, *Physical World of the Greeks* [London 1956], 12f.) thought there was none because there was no reason why there should have been. Herodotus appears among the critics of naturalism, primarily as an exponent of the importance of divine intervention. One would expect him to appear again as one whose work contributed to the *nomos/phusis* question. On the whole question of the reaction to the speculations of the *phusiologoi* one would welcome some more about the serious sophists. Even Protagoras makes a surprisingly brief appearance, and I., like most of those who write about him, fails to comment on the perhaps not insignificant fact that he came from the same city as Democritus, whose atomism was the most extreme example of the kind of thinking which failed to satisfy those – including perhaps himself – who were interested in man and society. Arguably Protagoras rather than Socrates deserves Cicero's accolade (*Tusc.* 5.4.10) for bringing philosophy down to earth and forcing it to concern itself with ethics, and Democritus may have been the proximate cause. In this section G.B.Kerferd's *Sophistic Movement* is a most surprising omission from the bibliography. The tragedians are included in the bundle 'critics of naturalism' (p.43): when I. explains that though they were not moral philosophers (!) they consider moral and political issues, he should have explained to the presumed audience of this book that they were perceived by Athenian society to have a teaching role – hence, of course, the fuss in the *Republic*, even if one thinks *Frogs* 1009 has nothing to do with this.

With Socrates, Plato and Aristotle we are in the area of I.'s real expertise, and here he gives as good and accurate a picture of these thinkers as the state of knowledge and the space available allows. Not that everyone would agree with all he says, but those who come to this book with little or no knowledge of the ancient world will be well served. One's doubts again pertain mainly to matters outside mainstream philosophy. Thus one might question whether the Thirty, Aeschines in *Timarchum* 173 notwithstanding, were guided by any coherent political thought rather than by fascistic opportunism: if Socrates was held responsible for the behaviour of Critias, personal association would surely have sufficed. It is, moreover, not easy to find a philosophy to explain both Critias and Alcibiades. One might also ask whether Socrates' search for definitions was really the result of a situation like that at Corcyra indicated by Thucydides' description of the use of persuasive definition in 3.82 (cf. pp.73-75) rather than the 5th century debates of which that was a symptom and Thucydides' account of the ideology of *stasis* a paradigm case.

An interesting and important point in this section is I.'s attribution (pp.78f.) to Socrates of the much discussed unity of the virtues in Plato. Lack of space is perhaps the reason for the misleading suggestion that Plato founded the Academy at or shortly after Socrates'

death. More serious is the notion that the difference between knowledge and opinion in the *Meno*, where both have the same object, is the same as that in the fully developed Theory of Ideas where they do not. This presumably arises from the view that will raise most eyebrows among specialists, and which should not be served up to others without clear warnings, that Plato's ideas may not exist separately and that, even if they do, the separation is not argued for by him or invoked in differentiating between Forms and sensible objects (pp.92-94). This view is propounded and carefully considered by Gail Fine, in the face of Aristotle's apparently clear testimony to the contrary, in 'Separation', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 31-87, but not finally accepted by her: she inclines rather to the weaker position that Plato did not explicitly argue for separation and may not have thought it crucial. Incidentally the technique of turning the soul in the right direction which is mentioned at several points in *Republic* 7 is not there related to the Socratic type of ethical enquiry, but is connected with the Pythagorean mathematical part of the Guardians' education.

When he comes to discuss Plato on the soul's immortality I. does not discuss the apparent inconsistencies between the *Phaedo* and *Rep.*10 on the one hand and *Rep.*4, *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* on the other. He takes Plato's position as being that we are identical with our reason, and that that alone is immortal (pp.99-101), and points to the difficulty that, in so far as the reason does not have some of the characteristics that make an individual such as he is, the surviving part of any individual may be indistinguishable from that of others. If Plato did hold that view the objection is a serious one: it was to be confronted later by Plotinus (cf. esp. *Enn.* 4.9. and 5.7).

Plotinus makes a first appearance in a concluding section on later misunderstandings of Plato, where (p.114) he is somewhat misleadingly described as a prominent successor of the dogmatic movement in Platonism revived by Antiochus. On close reading Plotinus need only be attached to Speusippus: it would be helpful if it could be made clear that Antiochus' Platonism was of a very different kind, which was soon if not immediately recognised as being a form of Stoicism (cf. *qui* [Antiochus] *appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus*, Cicero, *Academica* 2.43.132). Though Plotinus' thought certainly contained some Stoic elements, the Aristotelian influence on his basic Platonism was much stronger (cf. Porphyry's well-known remark at *Vita Plotini* 14.-7).

The chapter on Aristotle is perhaps the best in the book. Some will be surprised to find a defence of teleology (pp.128-30), and the rather too easy solution of the notorious discrepancy between *Nicomachean Ethics* 1 and 10 on *eudaimonia*, namely that 'In his considered view, contemplation is the highest and best part of our good, but not the whole of it'. (p.141). If only Aristotle had given more indication that he had considered the problem. Here and elsewhere I. perhaps overemphasizes the systematic side of Aristotle without giving sufficient due to the extent to which he conducted philosophy by exploration and was prepared to leave questions open or with provisional answers. For perhaps obvious reasons this chapter best exemplifies one of the great merits of the book, which is to show so clearly that the ancient philosophers are ones whose views should be taken seriously as attempts at the solution of philosophical problems which are still with us. That perhaps explains why Aristotle's biological work receives so little attention, though not all of it is obsolete.

In his section on Aristotle's influence I. sees the contrast between those who are more prone to follow Plato than Aristotle and those of the reverse tendency as starting in late antiquity. That is only true if one thinks of late antiquity as ending somewhere around 180 A.D. It is certainly the case that in the Middle Platonic period there were Platonists, most notably Atticus, who attacked Aristotle, but from Plotinus, and more especially Porphyry and Iamblichus onwards, all Platonists absorbed large parts of Aristotle into their systems, often by way of translating his ideas into Platonist ones. The usual line, probably to be attributed to Iamblichus, was that Aristotle was to be studied as propaedeutic to Plato: the Aristotle they read would have been more easily recognised at Tübingen than at most places in the English-speaking world, a development hinted at by I. himself on p.143. Even the apparently

conspicuous exception, Philoponus, directed his *Contra Aristotelem* (*disiecta membra* now assembled and translated by Ch. Wildberg, *Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World* [London 1987]) primarily against the concept of an eternal fifth element and the consequential absence of a time when the world was created: for the second of these propositions he would once have found respectable Platonist allies (cf. Proclus, in *Timaeum* 1.277.8ff.). Another point arising from time-scales: while I.'s comment that Athens was an international centre of philosophical study, with its implication that it was the leading one, was true for the Hellenistic period and the early Empire, it ceases to be so in late antiquity, when Alexandria was at least as important – in the fourth century, the last with which this volume deals, much more so – and other centres like Gaza had their own temporary efflorescence.

Epicureanism is seen as an alternative method to Scepticism for obtaining peace of mind, an aspect of scepticism which is perhaps overemphasized. In this light it is rejected by Epicureans on the grounds that doubt leads to distress, and trust in the senses is an antidote. The supreme practitioners of *ataraxia*, the gods, live between worlds subject to destruction, which would seem to imply that each world is made up of a discrete group of atoms, not the usual understanding of how worlds come to be, even though it might be true at any one moment. As for Epicurean friendship, I. doubts their genuine commitment to it in so far as it appears to be merely instrumental. In general I. gives a fair account of the main tenets of Epicureanism while being clearly out of sympathy with it. One has the impression that the main reason for this lack of sympathy is the relative philosophical crudity of the system (cf. esp. 160-63). He might perhaps have noted that Epicureanism was almost totally missing from the mixture that was produced by Late Greek Philosophy.

With the Stoics I. clearly feels that he has views which are worth arguing against. For non-expert readers it is a pity that he returns to the old picture of a virtually undifferentiated Stoicism, even if he does so with a warning, setting the development aside with a note that it took place but is difficult to trace (p.241, n.1). This is unfortunate, not only in that it fails to do justice to the philosophical efforts of the Stoics, but also because the earlier forms of Stoicism would not so easily, on the basis of the surviving evidence, account for its appeal both to Roman laymen and to later philosophers, to which I. draws the reader's attention at several points.

From his high estimate of Stoicism I. goes on to explain the other-worldly aspects of Neoplatonism, and Christianity, as a reaction to the failure of the best possible scientific methods, as used in Stoicism and Aristotelianism, to give them what they needed (pp.182f.). Excessive stress on that aspect of Neoplatonism, particularly inappropriate in the case of Plotinus, is one of the factors that cause I.'s treatment of that philosopher to be the least satisfactory part of the book. It will merely serve to confirm the prejudices of those in the English speaking tradition who think of Plotinus in the same pigeon-hole as Madame Blavatsky – or, more reputably, Dodds' interest in the paranormal – and have abstained from reading either the *Enneads* or the work that has been done on them in the last 40 years or so. That he has included Plotinus, and treated him as a serious philosopher certainly absolves I. from that charge, but the results are none the better for that. Those who have the whole of the *Enneads* know that mysticism appears very infrequently. Porphyry (*Vita Plot.* 23.15-17) tells us that Plotinus had no more than four mystical experiences during the whole time – some six years – that he was with him (ibid. 5.1f.).

Most of what Plotinus says about direct intuition at the level of *Nous* is no more than a possible filling of the vacuum in Plato about what happens in the top section of the Line, or when the trainees see the Form of the Good, nor is it any different in kind from the non-propositional thought which, in spite of recent denials (cf. e.g. R. Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum* [London 1983] 139-42: Sorabji goes further and claims that Intellection in Plotinus is also propositional, ibid. 152-55; *contra* A.C. Lloyd, 'Non-propositional thought in Plotinus', *Phronesis* 31 [1986], 258-65), most people would say was what goes on when Aristotle's intellect becomes identical with its objects. While Plotinus says more about it, his contention that it is a more reliable form of cognition than discursive reasoning or sense-perception, does not

separate him from classical Greek philosophy, and one of the few survivals of Epicureanism might be found in the re-appearance of *epibole* in various contexts, including the One's relation to itself (*Enn.* 6 7.39.1f.).

Somewhat curiously I. (p.186) quotes Plotinus' last words (*Vita Plot.* 2.26f.) as advice to us. Given that these words are the worst crux in Porphyry's *Life* so that we shall probably never know what they were, it is at least equally possible that they refer to Plotinus' attitude to his own death, and what he expected that would achieve for him: of all this, not a word. To say that Plotinus rejects the commonsense view that there are many souls and argues for the existence of one is a gross oversimplification, since Plotinus on more than one occasion tries to show that these two views are not inconsistent (cf. esp. 4.9, written expressly to deal with this point): in any case it is not the hypostasis Soul with which the individual souls are normally identified. More surprisingly, he takes the intuitive intellect as being occupied with the One (pp.192f.), thereby missing the crucial point, for Plotinus, that the mere duality of subject and object in Intellect, which had been highlighted by Alexander in the course of discussing their identity (cf. e.g. *De an.* 88.2ff, 89.20ff.), prevented it from being the supreme principle (cf. e.g. 5.5 *passim*). On the other hand I. does recognise the advance Plotinus made over classical philosophers by his careful avoidance of talking about immaterial entities as if they were material (p.200). It is a pity that he says almost nothing about that large part of Plotinus' work which deals with man's place and activity in the physical world.

A final chapter deals with Christianity: on this I feel incompetent to comment in detail, but cannot help noticing some highly questionable statements. It is simply not true that though at first philosophy influenced Christianity, the influence went the other way later. It does not become true till the end of antiquity, when Christian influence can be found in the later work of Philoponus (there is still no published work to equal the treatment of the evolution of Philoponus' ideas in K. Verrycken's massive 1985 Leuven dissertation, *God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus: De overgang van een Alexandrijns-Neoplatonische naar een Christelijke Scheppingsleer*). Porphyry, Proclus and Simplicius remained opposed to any Christian influence while pagan Neoplatonists like Olympiodorus teaching at Alexandria even after Philoponus show no signs of it. Much of I.'s treatment is focussed on Augustine: given his absorption of many philosophical ideas that is reasonable enough, but the subordination of philosophy to Christianity, which tended to be characteristic of the Latin West gives a very different picture from that which might have been conveyed by some consideration of the almost contemporary Cappadocians, or even Clement and Origen. When he talks about some of the Christological controversies it is odd that he makes no mention of the fact that Arianism fits much better with Neoplatonic views on the structure of the world than does Nicene orthodoxy. And yet he seems to exaggerate the philosophical input into early Christianity. Did Christianity really require Stoic ethics to show it '... how to be unworldly, without being indifferent to the state of the world or to the practices and institutions needed to maintain a human community' (pp.183f.), when that could be learnt from the Pentateuch and the Gospels? That a similarity of preoccupations made Stoicism attractive to some of the philosophically inclined Fathers before Neoplatonism came to subsume other philosophies is another matter.

This concluding chapter perhaps even more than others touches on problems which could generate a library. Its inclusion, contrary to the general custom of books on Greek philosophy, is a return to the comprehensiveness sought in the pre-Socrates chapters. I. is quite right to say that an account of Greek philosophy would be lacunose without it, but if the available space precluded both, this reader at least would gladly have exchanged it for an account of the last three centuries of the truly Greek tradition.